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Abstract
Freshwater community-based aquaculture was introduce to village irrigation tanks in
the dry zones of Sri Lanka in order to off-set the limited supply of animal protein
available to residents in inland areas. This paper examines transaction costs associated
with the management of community-based aquaculture in Anuradhapura district, the
most important inland fish production area in the country. Using data from 41 tanks
and 340 households, the study finds that community-based aquaculture involves three
types of management forms: tank management by farmer organizations, mangaement
by sub-group within farmer organizations and out-sourcing of management to third
parties. All three institutional arrangements involve transaction costs associated with
information provision, collective decision-making, and protection of fish harvest from
poachers. While the costs of information provision and collective decision-making are
relatively low under all three institutional arrangements, the cost of protection is
significant and is considerably reduced when the entire farmer’s association is involved
in tank management. In general, while community based fisheries contributes cash flow
to farmer organizations and bolsters village food security, the benefits to individual
farmers are low. Hence, farmers have little incentive to participate in collective action.
Of the three different institutional arrangements, management by farmer sub-groups is
the most successful in providing benefits to participants. The study suggests that
sustainability of community-based aquaculture depends on successes in experimenting
with institutional arrangements that can minimize transaction costs and achieve adequate
returns to participants through productivity gains from tanks.
Key words: Community-base aquaculture, transaction costs, farmer organizations,
irrigation tanks, fisheries, Sri Lanka
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Transaction Costs and Institutional Innovation:
Sustainability of Tank Aquaculture in Sri Lanka
Athula Senaratne and Kalpa Karunanayake
1.  Introduction
Rural poverty and malnutrition are common in the dry zone of Sri Lanka.  The main
source of animal proteins for an average Sri Lankan is fish and nearly 90 % of the
supply comes from marine sources (Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources 2004).
The supply of fish from marine sources to inland dry zone areas is limited due to various
reasons such as limited surplus available after meeting the demand from coastal areas,
inadequate cold transport facilities, and the poor keeping quality of products.  Therefore,
only a limited supply of animal proteins is available to residents in the inland dry zone
areas, leading to high incidence of protein deficiency among them.
One possible strategy to address this problem is to increase the production of freshwater
fish in inland areas using the existing infrastructure of village irrigation tanks.  Village
tanks are basically rainwater-harvesting devices established for paddy cultivation under
water scarcity conditions.  They have helped achieve the food security goals of
successive generations over a period of over two millennia and continue to play an
important role in irrigated agriculture even today.  In addition to irrigation, village tanks
fulfill a variety of other rural agrarian needs, which include traditional fisheries, domestic
water uses, bathing and washing, and animal husbandry.  But village irrigation tanks
are common property resources (CPR) and all user rights are defined with respect to
an identified community of villagers.  Hence, utilization of village tank resources invariably
requires collective action.
Even though village irrigation tanks have the natural potential to support a fish population,
a vast majority of them are seasonal reservoirs (Thayaparan 1982).  As a result, very
low productivity levels have been observed due to intermittent disturbance to fish life
cycles during annual drying up of tanks (Chakrabarty and Samaranayke 1983).  In
order to improve fish productivity in village tanks, scientists have proposed recruitment
of fish fingerlings artificially and management of these tanks through community
involvement (see Appendix I for details).
Community-based Aquaculture (CBA) in village irrigation tanks has a number of features
that appeal to policy makers and development workers. The major policy advantages
are: (a) involvement of local resources that directly deals with the rural poor; (b)
obligatory need for community participation due to common ownership; (c) ability to
cater to a larger section of the population due to widespread distribution of the resource-
base; (d) the low cost nature of the technologies involved and their successful
demonstration; and (e) the potential to address the problems of poverty, malnutrition
and unemployment simultaneously.  As a result, CBA has gradually captured the attention
of stakeholders such as the central government agencies, provincial governments in
the tank areas, donors, and NGOs.
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CBA in village tanks is introduced through a local institution called ‘Farmer
Organizations’ (FO) which is an institution established primarily for irrigation water
management for paddy farming.  The objective of this model is to promote aquaculture
as a rural enterprise undertaken by community groups, with only the initial catalytic
support by the government.  As FOs are community-based organizations, aquaculture
in village irrigation tanks is essentially a collective action venture.
Collective action requires cooperation among resource users.  In the case of CBA,
however, the issue of cooperation among resource users is complicated by a number
of factors.  Village tanks and associated institutional arrangements have evolved
historically in the context of subsistence, family-based farming systems, which depended
on commonly held rights over a majority of other village resources too (Somasiri 2001;
Ulluwishewa 1997).  This traditional subsistence farming system is currently being
replaced by a commercialized system where associated resource ownership patterns
too are transforming themselves to predominantly privately-owned resources.
Simultaneously, agricultural technologies used by farmers are also being fast
‘modernized’.
Further, CBA is a non-traditional use of the resource.  Even though small-scale capture
fishing has been in existence since ancient times, aquaculture itself is not a familiar
practice in village tanks.  Collective action for this non-traditional use therefore has to
be rallied through an institutional arrangement that developed for irrigation water
management.  Due to these reasons, the process of adoption of CBA by groups has
been exceedingly slow despite the favourable policy climate and positive technical
demonstrations.
Researchers have examined the collective action problem in a variety of contexts that
involve common property resources (Meinzen-Dick and Knox 1999; Agarwal and
Ostrom 1999).  Among the most frequently asked questions are why collective action
is successful in certain CPRs while it fails in others, and what conditions would ensure
successful cooperation among community groups (Wade 1980; Ostrom 1990).
Collective action, however, is not a costless phenomenon and involves transaction
costs (TC) for information, negotiations, making agreements, ensuring compliance and
monitoring (Abdullah, et. al. 1998; Kuperan, et. al., 1998; Hannah 1995).  Hence,
some scholars have proposed the concept of transaction cost to explain certain aspects
of the evolution of institutions that manage CPRs.
In the present paper, we use the concept of transaction cost to examine collective
action in CBA in village irrigation tanks of Sri Lanka.  The system of village irrigation
tanks has managed to survive over a period of two millennia as CPR through its ability
to continuously evolve institutional arrangements to adapt to new realities (Panabokke
2001).  Given such a time-tested record of collective action, there is great potential to
develop CBA in village irrigation tanks. This study, therefore, attempts to:
a)   Assess the importance of costs associated with institutional factors that in turn
affect collective action; and,
SANDEE Working Paper No. 18-06 3
b) Identify suitable institutional arrangements and management strategies that would
help ensure sustainable collective action among resource users.
The next section of the paper provides background information on the evolution of
institutional arrangements in village tanks and CBA. It is followed in Section 3 by a
description of the study site and sources of data used in the study. The methodology
and conceptual framework for the study are discussed in section 4 and results of the
empirical investigation are discussed in section 5. Section 6 conclude the paper and
discussed various policy implications.
2.  Background
The last one and a half centuries have been an era of regular experiments when it
comes to institutional arrangements vis-à-vis  village irrigation tanks wherein
responsibilities were shifted from the state to community and vice-versa very frequently
(Panabokke, et. al. 2002; Aheeyar 2001).  In the past, a tank-village in the dry zone
consisted of the following basic components: (a) the tank; (b) the housing area (or
gangoda); (c) the command area (i.e., the paddy-field area serviced by the tank); (d)
the rain-fed upland crop area (chena); and (e) the tank catchment (Somasiri 2001).
Of these components, common ownership included not just the tank but the lands in
the catchment area and rain-fed upland crop areas  while the villagers used goods and
services extracted from them in usufruct (Ulluwishewa, 1997).  Households usually
held private rights to plots in the village paddy field and the homestead area.
These traditional resource ownership patterns are presently under transformation.  The
Crown Lands Encroachment Act, enacted by the British rulers in the first half of the 19th
century, initially catalyzed this process (Abeysinghe 1978; Government of Sri Lanka,
1990).  The process was further accelerated by: (a) commercialization of local economies;
(b) ‘modernization’ of agriculture; and (c) increasing population (Aheeyar 2001; Leach
1971; Panabokke, et. al. 2002; Ulluwishewa 1997).  Accordingly, most communally
held lands allocated for highland crops and tank catchments have been converted to
permanent, private lands (Ulluwishewa 1997).  These changes in ownership and tenure
patterns were closely followed by ensuing changes in institutional arrangements.
The transformation in the tenure pattern coincided with the launching of the village-
tank aquaculture programme by the former Inland Fisheries Division of the Ministry of
Fisheries in the late seventies (Chakrabarty & Samaranayake 1983; Thayaparan 1982;
Chandrasoma 1986).  This programme was carried out as a promotional activity of the
state with the support of a few individuals selected from the tank sites who were
provided with fish fingerlings from government breeding centres.  It was the experience
gained from this programme that helped establish the technical feasibility of aquaculture
in seasonal village tanks.  Despite early signs of success, however, the aquaculture
programme faced total collapse in 1990 when the government decided to withdraw
support for the inland fisheries and aquaculture sector.  This revealed the vulnerability
of the initial model where no significant attempt was made to install a suitable institutional
arrangement at the local level.  The programme was resumed again in 1994 when the
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government reinstated support to the inland fisheries and aquaculture sector.  It was
introduced as a community-based venture organized under the patronage of FOs with
the government providing only the initial catalytic support.
The outcome of the community-based aquaculture programme since the resumption of
state support however has been mixed.  While a handful of communities have succeeded
in completing a few cycles of production on their own initiative, the programme has
faced problems in many tanks after external support was lifted. These failures are
usually attributed to reasons such as inadequate number of extension staff and poor
dedication of extension workers; scarcity of fish fingerlings; poor coordination among
relevant stakeholders, etc.  Although these reasons no doubt explain the slow progress
of the state programmes carried out to provide initial catalytic support, they have limited
explanatory potential from an overall policy perspective.  It is highly unlikely that initial
catalytic support from the state would be provided to all feasible village irrigation tanks
even in the long run. Finally, the success of interventions like this depends largely on
the voluntary adoption of collective action by community groups on a large-scale who
would ensure its feasibility by setting an example of success to neighbouring locations.
In the following section we describe the study area and method of data collection
adopted for the analysis in this paper.
3.  Study Area and Data Collection
This study was conducted in 2003-2004 in the Anuradhapura district, which is located
in the heart of the dry zone in Sri Lanka. It is also the district with the highest inland
fish production in the country and houses 2334 inland water bodies covering a total
inland water area of 51,500 ha.  It ranks first in the country in terms of consumption of
freshwater fish with 2,482 g/month per household as CBA has been practised in the
highest number of village tanks here.  Hence, Anuradhapura District naturally becomes
first choice for the study area.
This study is based on primary data collected both at the community (tank)-level as
well as the household level. Community-level data was collected using a checklist
whereas an interview schedule was used to elicit household information.
Information was collected from a total of 41 tanks covering a majority of locations where
CBA had been practiced during the recent past. The cross-section of selected sites
included tanks where CBA had been practised continuously for a few cycles after initial
catalytic support was lifted as well as tanks where programmes were abandoned after
one or two cycles.  Information about each tank and the community it supported was
collected from a number of sources, including official records, village officers, agriculture
and irrigation officers, members of FOs, and village elders.  The tank level data was
collected on the following major aspects: (a) physical information on the seasonal tank;
(b) details on agricultural activities and irrigation; (c) details on fish production in tanks
(i.e., details of past culture cycles, economic cost/return details on last culture cycle,
organizational arrangements, group characteristics, funding of fish culture programmes,
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organizational activities/meetings, time-allocation, supporting organizations/extension
services, marketing, etc.)
Household-level data was collected from 340 randomly selected households in the 41
tank sites covered by the survey. The household sample consisted of 208 households
that had participated in CBA at least once while the remaining 132 households were
non-participants.  The sample households represented a total population of 1632 of
which 50.5 % were females.  The average family size was 4.8.  The household survey
gathered information on the following aspects: (a) living conditions/facilities and
ownership of assets; (b) location and infrastructure facilities in the village; (c) income
and sources; (d) household expenditure and credit; (e) details on agriculture activities;
(f) the nature of involvement in fish culture activities (i.e., contribution, labor use,
organizational involvements, sharing of benefits, etc.).
Table 1 provides a social profile of the households covered in the survey.  As evident,
the sample represented a somewhat homogeneous social group consisting mainly of
households coming from the Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-religious background.  On the
whole, households were related to each other through kinship.   In the case of
participants, the overall income recorded a significant contribution (35 per cent) from
seasonal sources whereas non-participant households had a higher share of income
from regular sources (74 per cent).  However, no significant difference was observed
in the total income of the two groups.
Table 1:  A socio-economic profile of households surveyed
Household Parameter No. Households % 
Head of the household 
Male  
 
330 
 
97.0 
Religion 
Buddhists 
Hindu 
Islam 
Christian 
 
309 
1 
28 
2 
 
91.0 
0.0 
8.0 
0.0 
Education (Head of HH) 
No formal education 
Grade 1-5 
Grade 6-11 
O/L passed 
A/L passed 
University 
 
6 
85 
150 
71 
24 
4 
 
2.0 
25.0 
44.0 
21.0 
7.0 
1.0 
Major occupation (Head of HH) 
Farming 
Government service 
Trader 
Self-employed 
Private sector 
Labourer 
Fish farmer 
 
266 
26 
14 
13 
11 
07 
03 
 
78.0 
8.0 
4.0 
4.0 
3.0 
2.0 
1.0 
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Any productive venture, irrespective of type of ownership, involves activities pertaining
to input-output transformation and exchange of (property) rights (Eggertson 1990).
Costs involved with input-output transformation are the usual ‘production costs’.
Exchange of property rights gives rise to ‘transaction costs’ for collecting information,
making negotiations, reaching agreements, and enforcement and monitoring of
agreements.  The concept of transaction cost has been developed as a tool for
comparative analysis of institutions by the ‘Neo-institutional Economics’ (NE) and ‘New
Institutional Economics’ (NIE) schools (Eggertson 1990; Williamson 1973 and 1998;
North 1978 and 1989).  Different institutional arrangements are considered as outcomes
of the interplay between the behavioural attributes of agents, nature of transactions
involved, and associated institutional environments (Birner and Wittmer 2000).  The
framework is guided by the basic premise known as ‘Discriminating-alignment
Hypothesis’, which asserts that transactions that differ in their cost and competence
tend to align with ‘governance structures’ (that differ in their cost and competence),
that minimize transaction costs (Williamson 1998).
In a common property regime where no one owns exclusive private rights over the
resource, exchange of property rights usually requires the creation of institutional
arrangements (governance structures) that provide a mechanism for the organization
of collective action among stakeholders (co-owners).  A given institutional arrangement
is usually associated with a corresponding structure of transaction costs.  Kuperan, et.
al., (1998) attempted to estimate the major types of ex-ante and ex-post transaction
costs involved in the context of fisheries co-management.  Ex-ante costs are information
and collective decision-making costs whereas ex-post transaction costs include
enforcement and monitoring costs.  They have pointed out that different management
regimes (i.e., co-management versus the regulatory approach) tend to enlist different
types of transaction costs while the burden of those costs to government and community
partners may vary accordingly.
When an existing institutional arrangement is transformed to a new one, changes usually
take place in the transaction cost structure as well.  Hannah (1995) suggested that the
introduction of co-management in place of regulatory approaches tends to shift the
high ex-ante transaction cost from the state to the communities.  Further, co-management
has the potential to increase the ex-ante transaction costs while achieving gains from
ex-post transactions (Abdullah, et. al. 1998; Kuperan, et. al. 1998).
The burden of transaction cost could vary among individual households in a given
community group too in addition to that between the government and community groups.
Adhikari and Lovett (2005) have shown that the transaction cost for community forest
management in Nepal is higher for wealthier households compared to poorer households
on average though the burden for poorer households as a percentage of resource
appropriation costs is higher than that for richer households. Further, the transaction
cost varies among different community groups (villages) too.
Based on a study conducted in two co-managed wildlife dispersal areas in Kenya,
Mburu, et. al., (2003) show that the magnitude of transaction costs incurred by
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(individual) land owners is influenced by a number of factors.  Among them are: (a)
attributes of transactions; (b) bio-physical and ecological characteristics of resource
systems; (c) human, social, and financial capital of land owners; (d) losses from human-
wild life conflicts; (e) tenure security; and (f) benefits from conservation.  They further
suggest that the influence of these factors is not the same in different locations and that
transaction costs are determined by a combination of factors specific to a local site.
3.1  Transaction Costs for CBA
CBA has the usual production costs and transaction costs.  Assuming that there are no
significant costs or benefits generated due to the interaction of activities, a simplified
model of the overall economic benefit structure in a village irrigation tank can be given
as follows.
 Bt = Bi + Bf + Bo (1)
 Bt = Total Economic Benefits of the Seasonal Tank
 Bi = Net Benefits from Irrigation
 Bf = Net Benefits from Rural Aquaculture
 Bo= Net Benefits from Other Uses
Given that benefits from aquaculture are conditional upon collective action, the decision
rule to adopt CBA in a given seasonal tank can be stated by:
 Bf  > TC (2)
TC = Transaction cost of organizing collective action
Table 2 summarizes the major types of transactions associated with organizing collective
action for CBA.  Each of the mentioned activities involves a certain level of transaction
cost, which may or may not be accounted in terms of monetary value.
Table 2:  Transactions in CBA in village irrigation tanks
Type Transactions 
Searching and information  Accessing scientific methods and species for 
culture 
Collective decision making Organizing meetings, reaching agreements, 
coordinating with authorities 
Enforcement and monitoring 
compliance 
Organization of tank preparation actions, 
stocking, etc.  
Prevention of free rider 
activity 
Protection from poaching 
Distribution of benefits Organizing harvesting 
Monitoring the distribution of benefits 
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In any collective action context, decision-making takes place at least on two levels,
namely, collective (community-level) decisions on adopting the action and individual
(household level) decisions on whether to participate in it.  The transaction cost structure
associated with a given institutional arrangement has a variable impact over the decisions
of individual agents and collective groups.  The abandonment of collectively adopted
decisions on the grounds of poor participation by individual members is commonly
observed in rural development.
As discussed, collective action for CBA in village tanks is usually the responsibility
of FOs.  Accordingly, certain elements of transaction costs are incurred by FOs.  In
addition to these, there are elements of transaction cost that are borne individually
by members mainly as labour-time contribution.  While a part of this contribution
accounts for usual ‘production costs’, the share of labour used for collecting
information, negotiation, reaching agreements, and monitoring activities represent
transaction costs. Since all contributions from households have opportunity cost
implications, the share borne by a household becomes a deciding factor that influences
individual participation in CBA.
Table 3 presents the major types of transaction cost involved and methods adopted to
measure them in our study.  Most transaction costs are incurred as opportunity cost of
time and only a limited amount of direct cash payments are involved.  In rural economies,
time costs incurred by households are not always backed by observable ‘monetary values’
based on market-based prices.  Instead, such decisions rely on ‘shadow prices’, which
reflect the opportunity cost of time (Sadoulet and De Janvry 1995).  In estimating
transaction costs, general wage rates available in the area for agricultural labour was
used as a proxy for the opportunity cost of time. Monitoring activities such as watching
for poachers was an activity usually undertaken during the night.  Application of general
wage rates in this case was hence not appropriate.  However, this activity was carried
out by hired watchers in 7 tanks and the average wage rate paid for these watchers was
applied to estimate the cost of watching by unpaid community members in other tanks
too.  In all other cases, cost was measured in terms of the average wage in the specific
community multiplied by the total time spent on the transactions plus any cash payments.
Table 3: Methods of estimating transaction costs
WR = average wage
 Transaction  Nature of 
Transactions 
 Nature of Cost  Approach 
 Organization of 
collective action 
 Meetings/ dealing 
with agents 
 Time for 
meetings/ action 
 Value of time 
(WR × time) 
 Ensuring the 
implementation of 
decisions 
 Meetings/ 
 dealing with 
agents 
 Time for 
meetings/ action 
 Value of time 
(WR × time) 
 Avoiding free rider 
activities 
Watching/ 
dealing with 
officers 
 Cash payments/ 
time cost for 
watching 
 Wage cost / 
 Value of time 
(WR × time) 
 Organizing the 
sharing of benefits 
 Meetings  Time for 
meetings 
 Value of time 
(WR × time) 
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The transaction cost in CBA was computed for the different institutional arrangements
adopted for CBA. This analysis and their implications are discussed in the following
sections.
4.  Analysis of Findings
In the study area there are three types of contractual arrangements: (a) organizing of
culture operations by the FO itself (10 tanks; 26%); (b) forming of a separate Fisheries
Sub-Committee (FSC) under the FO (27 tanks, 67%); and (c) contracting of rights to
culture fish in tanks to another party by the FO (3 tanks; 7%).  In one tank, the
government had stocked fingerlings without the support of any local institution.  In the
first two arrangements, a sub-group of FOs had taken on the operational responsibility
of the aquaculture programmes while in the third non-members of FO were also involved.
Fisheries Sub-Committees: Establishing a FSC is the dominant contractual
arrangement observed in two thirds of the sample.  The average number of members in
a FSC is 19 (range 6-54).   The FSC, always a sub-group of the FO, has been contracted
by the FO to carry out aquaculture in return for a share of benefits, usually in cash.
The remaining income is shared between the members of the FSC, principally on equal
terms but with minor adjustments to reflect contributions by different members.  The
major feature of this arrangement is that FO members who are not in the FSC do not
have any ownership claim for fish harvested after the stocking of tanks.   Hence the
members of FSC usually carry out their activities more independently while meetings
and other organizational arrangements record participation by limited numbers.
Farmer Organization: The basic difference between this arrangement and that of the
separate FSC is that under the FO  the entire membership has an equivalent claim for
the final harvest, the income earned from which is usually credited to the FO’s fund.  In
addition, a portion of harvest is also distributed among the members, usually a small
quantity of fish for each household.   As far as collective action is concerned, other
than meetings to decide on arrangements at which there is participation by a majority
of the members, a sub-group of members usually organize and carry out aquaculture
operations on behalf of the entire membership.  The average size of the fish culture
group was 31 (range 3-60), which is significantly larger than that of the FSC.  While
members who make a greater contribution are paid by the FO, a significant amount of
labour comes as unpaid minor contributions from other members.  This is an advantage
from the point of view of the organization.
Other contractual parties: This arrangement was found only in tanks where the FO
is non-functional or quite weak.  In the sample, this arrangement was found only in 3
tanks.   This is similar to a private rental arrangement as the contracted parties did not
have any ownership claim to the resource base (i.e., village tanks) unlike in the other
two cases.  The smallest-size groups were observed under this arrangement averaging
8 (range 5-13).
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Figure 1 and Table 4 provide details on the three types of transaction cost that have
been  reported.  The costs given in the Table are aggregates of individually incurred
costs computed for a given tank.  The cost for searching and gathering of information
is relatively low due to the specific circumstances found in village tanks.   Firstly,
members of fish culture groups already possess substantial knowledge, both on resource
conditions and contracting parties as they have already obliged on activities based on
the same resource with the same group.  Secondly, groups are usually small.  As per
acquiring technical know-how, however, participants have to incur some cost as they
have to participate in awareness- and training-programmes conducted by Government
Extension Officers on aquaculture operations.  It should be noted that this does not
include the expenses incurred by the government in order to conduct training- and
awareness-programmes.
However, groups have to incur transaction costs for making collective decisions,
enforcing and monitoring them.  The most important fact is that these costs are borne
individually by members of the active group, except in 8 tanks where hired watchers
were recruited using organizational funds.  Many communities hold meetings to decide
on organizational matters of CBA on a few occasions (2.5 times on average in the
range of 0-4).  Usually, costs were appropriated in terms of time and they were valued
using a uniform wage rate, which does not reflect the real opportunity cost with respect
to a given household.   In all three institutional arrangements, work is distributed among
members of the active group in a uniform manner (76% in FSC; 70% in FO and 100%
in others) while in the case of two tanks there were penalties for neglect of work.
Compared with information and collective decision-making costs, enforcement and
monitoring costs were substantial.  Enforcement and monitoring costs basically imply
the cost of watching to prevent poaching measured in terms of the imputed value of
labour and/or actual payments made for the task.  Poaching used to be the most important
problem faced by CBA in many village tanks.  While poaching is an act of theft when
engaged in by outsiders, on most occasions the poachers came from the same
community.  Hence, it can be construed as a form of free riding as well.  On a few
occasions, litigation was pursued by involving the police for redress.
Table 4 also indicates the transaction cost under the three different institutional
arrangements.  As evident, the lowest average aggregate TC is reported in FO-managed
village tanks while the tanks managed by other parties contracted by the FOs recorded
the highest TC.  The average aggregate TC of FSC-managed tanks lie in between
these two.  This result is clearly indicative of the influence exerted by the three
institutional arrangements on the behaviour of the village community.  In the tanks where
the FO itself organized aquaculture, the TC incurred for training and collective decision-
making is relatively high as more participants were involved.  Yet, given the fact that a
wider section of the village community claims ownership of the fish cultured in tanks,
the TC for protection of the harvest is relatively low.  When the FO contracted the
rights of fish culture to a sub-group (FSC) or to another party from outside, they have
to incur more TC to protect the harvest from theft, or free riders, in successively high
amounts.  This reflects the villagers’ perception of ownership of fish cultured in tanks
under the three different institutional arrangements.
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Figure 1:  Share of transaction cost under different institutional arrangements
Table 4: Transaction cost under different institutional arrangements (tank per cycle of
production)
FO
9%
13%
78%
Information
Collective
Decision making
Enforcement &
Monitoring
FSC
5%
5%
90%
Information
Collective
Decision making
Enforcement &
Monitoring
Other
1%
2%
97%
Information
Collective
Decision making
Enforcement &
Monitoring
 Institutional 
arrangement 
Information cost 
(Rs) 
Collective decision-
making cost (Rs) 
Enforcement and 
monitoring cost (Rs)  
Total transaction cost 
(Rs) 
 Average Max  Min Average Max  Min Average Max  Min Average Max  Min 
Farmer 
Organization 
 
Fisheries 
Sub-
committee 
 
Other 
2,179 
(8.6%) 
 
1,854 
(5.2%) 
 
375 
(0.06%) 
9,010 
 
 
9,450 
 
 
1,500 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
3,187 
(12.7%) 
 
1,793 
(5.0%) 
 
1,150 
(2.6%) 
8,116 
 
 
9,075 
 
 
1,600 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
19,722 
(78.6%) 
 
32,069 
(89.8%) 
 
53,010 
(97.2%) 
77,520 
 
 
136,800 
 
 
168,720 
1,520 
 
 
2,280 
 
 
- 
25,088 
 
 
35,717 
 
 
54,535 
79,620 
 
 
138,750 
 
 
168,720 
3,420 
 
 
2,280 
 
 
500 
Overall 1,744 9,450 - 1,998 9,075 - 30,319  168,720 - 34,012 168,720 - 
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Production and efficiency of CBA
Production and returns from the tanks were highly variable.  As Table 5 shows, on
average, the value of fish relative to agriculture in the selected villages is only about
5%.  This relative value is 4.1 % in FO-managed tanks whereas in the case of FSC
managed tanks it is 5.6 %.  Given the magnitude of benefits involved, it is apparent
that aquaculture is not capable of providing a major livelihood for all members of a
given community.  As a result, in all three institutional arrangements, the organizational
responsibilities of CBA have been passed on to a smaller sub-group of stakeholders of
the tank.
Table 5:  Relative Income contribution in CBA
A net-benefit analysis was conducted in order to assess the economic viability of the
system.  It shows that nearly 60% of tanks managed by the FOs as well as the FSCs
indicate positive net margins.  Tanks managed by the FSCs have recorded the best
performance in terms of average production, fish productivity per unit area, and total
value of production and net margin, compared with the other two arrangements (Table
6).  Even though higher average revenues were indicated for a few tanks managed by
other contracted groups, they experienced higher average costs, too, particularly for
the harvesting of fish using hired labour which resulted in a net loss overall.  Tanks
managed by the FOs indicated a moderate situation as far as economic returns are
concerned.  The results of the net-benefit analysis indicate that village tank aquaculture
has the potential to qualify as an economically efficient system in a significant number
of tanks.
However, the net-benefit analysis was conducted using conventional criteria and the
TC was not taken into account in the analysis.  Therefore, an attempt was made to
assess the efficiency of the system using the net-margin analysis extended to test the
impacts of TC as well.  Here the extended net-benefit is defined as net-benefit minus
TC.  A culture programme in a tank was taken as a single unit and all costs, including
TC borne by individual members, were subtracted from returns.  Table 7 presents the
outcome of the analysis.
Once the transaction costs too are taken into consideration, particularly the cost incurred
for monitoring (i.e., watching the actions of poachers), community-based aquaculture
loses its appeal.  As Table 7 shows, only 35% of 41 tanks indicate a positive net-
benefit from aquaculture once all TC are taken into account.  This assumes importance
when the associated institutional aspects are also taken into consideration.  As indicated
in Table 4, transaction costs are higher in FSC-managed tanks than in FO-managed
Value 
parameter 
Total annual value 
of irrigated paddy 
(Rs) 
Total annual 
value of cultured 
fish (Rs) 
Avg. share of value  
of fish (%) 
Average  
Max 
Min 
4,883,842 
125,537,665 
96,925 
74,654 
540,000 
- 
4.8 
33 
- 
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tanks.  According to Table 7, despite high relative returns in FSC-managed tanks, only
33% tanks show a positive net margin once TC is taken into account compared with
50% of FO-managed tanks.  This is despite the fact that FO-managed tanks have
recorded relatively low average returns.  Overall, the outcome of the extended cost
analyses brings up some important issues, namely, (a) the transaction cost has a
substantial economic impact on a significant number of tanks; (b) the impact of the TC
is particularly significant in FSC-managed tanks, which is the dominant and more
productive institutional arrangement for CBA; and (c) this  could create a negative
impact on the adoption and sustainability of the activity in the long run.
Sensitivity Analysis without Transaction Costs
Given the fact that CBA is a risk-prone activity, a sensitivity analysis (without subtracting
TC) was carried out under three scenarios, namely, (a) reduction of benefits by 5%;
(b) increase of costs by 5%; and (c) a and b together.  The results indicate that on
average, net benefits decreased by 24%, 19%, and 43% respectively under the three
scenarios.  In one tank where positive net benefits were reported earlier, returns turned
negative. This indicates that returns from CBA in village tanks are vulnerable to
uncertainties.
Table 6: Economic performance of three institutional arrangements
Table 7: Results of the extended net margin analysis in tanks
Institutional 
Arrangement 
Average 
Production 
(kg) 
Average 
Productivity 
(kg/ha)  
Average  
Value of Total 
Product (Rs) 
Average 
Cost 
(Rs) 
Average 
Net 
M argin 
Farm er 
organization (FO ) 
 
Fisheries Sub-
Com mittee (FSC) 
 
O ther 
1,816.4 
 
2,387.8 
 
 
1,966.7 
132.3 
 
255.0 
 
 
206.7 
50,732.8 
 
87,733.9 
 
 
61,559.9 
45,841.0 
 
44,630.3 
 
 
102,566.7 
4,891.8 
 
43,103.6 
 
 
-
(41,006.8) 
 
O verall 
 
2,196 
 
218.2 
 
74,654.2 
 
48,447.7 
 
26,206.6 
 
Criteria No. Tanks with positive net margins 
 FO 
managed 
FSC 
managed 
Other Overall 
Net benefit under pure 'production 
costs' 
'Extended' net benefit including 
aggregate decision making and 
information costs 
'Extended' net benefit including 
aggregate monitoring costs as well 
06 (60%) 
 
05 (50%) 
 
 
05 (50%) 
 
16 (59%) 
 
15 (55%) 
 
 
09 (33%) 
 
 
01 (33%) 
 
01 (33%) 
 
 
- (0%) 
23(58%) 
 
21(53%) 
 
 
14 (35%) 
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Despite the vulnerable situation revealed in the financial analysis CBA has usually been
reported as a financially viable venture from the perspective of FOs as seed fish has
been provided either free, or on subsidized basis, as a promotional encouragement
from a state agency or a NGO in many tanks.  Besides, organizational cash flows
consider conventional costs and benefits only.  On a number of occasions, revenues
remitted from fish culture activities claimed a significant portion of the organizational
funds of FOs, which usually have a limited portfolio of other income-generating
activities.  This could lead to misleading implications unless the cost of subsidized
inputs and transaction costs are also taken into consideration.
Distribution of benefits from community-based aquaculture
Table 8 shows the average benefits divided (in cash and kind) among individual members
and organizations under the three institutional arrangements.  In a majority of tanks, a
certain amount of returns were retained with organizations while the remaining benefits
were distributed to individual members in the form of fish, money or both.  Returns
have been transferred to FOs in 28 (70%) tanks and in over 60 % of the cases this
portion amounted to less than 40% of total returns.  Aquaculture ventures failed
completely in three tanks, which left no benefits to distribute among either individual
members or organizations.
In 70% of the tanks, benefits were distributed to individuals as well.  These included 7
(70%) of FO-managed tanks and 21 (75%) of FSC-managed tanks.  However, in
many cases, individual benefits were restricted to a portion of the unsold fish harvest
and cash returns were distributed in only 19 (46%) tanks.  In 16 of them, income was
uniformly distributed among active members while in others benefits were distributed
according to work done in a proportionate manner. In addition to benefits distributed
among participants, during the event of harvesting, many non-participant community
members also benefited from the harvest in terms of small quantities of fish, which
could amount to a substantial portion of the harvest in aggregate.
The distribution of benefits differed widely among the three institutional arrangements.
Such variations were observed in the amount of cash retained by the organizations
(FO or FSC) as well as in the benefits distributed to individuals.  In a few tanks, a
complete portfolio of benefits (i.e., cash for FO and FSC and fish and cash for
individuals) was offered to all stakeholders involved.  Of the three institutional
arrangements, the FSC is relatively more successful in terms of organizational benefits
as well as in the magnitude of individual benefits (see Table 8).  However, contribution
to village food security was high in FO-managed tanks as the number of beneficiaries
was higher in those tanks.
On the whole, CBA has helped village communities in two important ways.  First, it
has helped earn some amount of cash returns for FOs in a majority of tanks.  This
income, though moderate in magnitude, seems to provide relief for many FOs with
poor cash flows as a means of overcoming their financial difficulties.  This can be
considered a benefit to the respective communities with indirect advantages to individual
households too.
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The second major contribution is support for village food security.  Table 8 shows that
an average of 6.5 kg of fish has been distributed among participant members.  In
margin, this can be considered a significant increment to household nutrition given the
fact that average fish consumption in the area has been estimated as 25 kg per household
per annum.  The fish output distributed among village communities increased the supply
of animal proteins to the rural poor in a significant manner.
However, despite the cash flow support for organizations and contributions to village
food security, the direct benefits to individual participants seem relatively low and does
not provide a strong incentive to attract participation.  Given the magnitude of benefits
involved, it is apparent that productivity improvements generated by CBA are not on a
scale that is adequate to provide a major livelihood for all members of a given community.
More equitable distribution of benefits, although contrary to the expectations of policy
makers, therefore, runs the risk of further thinning out incentives for the active group.
This essentially has implications for the sustainability aspect of the enterprise.
Participation in CBA and poverty
According to the household survey, incidence of poverty (i.e., percentage of households
in the sample with a per capita income lower than the official poverty line) among
participant and non-participant households are 26% and 20% respectively.  Despite this
slight gap in poverty in favour of non-participants, other income parameters do not indicate
a significant difference between the two groups.  The average annual household income
is slightly higher in the case of participants with a higher contribution from seasonal sources
(33%) compared with non-participants (26%).  Variation of income is significantly high
among participant households (CV = 103%) than non-participants (CV= 59%).  Overall,
it seems that households with variable, seasonal sources of income are more attracted
towards CBA than households which depend more on regular sources of income.  This is
quite understandable given the fact that the opportunity cost of time is usually higher for
regular income earners than those with seasonal employment.
Table 8:  Distribution of benefits of community-based aquaculture among participants
and organizations
Institutional 
arrangement 
Individual benefits Benefits retained by organizational Group  
 Fish (kg) Money (Rs)  By FSC  By FO By Others 
 No. 
Tanks 
Average No. 
Tanks 
Average No. 
Tanks 
Average 
(Rs) 
No. 
Tanks 
Average 
(Rs) 
No. 
Tanks 
Average 
(Rs) 
Farmer 
Organization 
(FO) 
 
Fisheries 
Sub-
Committee 
(FSC) 
 
Other 
8 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
1 
6.43 
 
 
 
6.54 
 
 
 
 
2.0 
4 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
- 
2236 
 
 
 
2813 
 
 
 
 
- 
- 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
- 
- 
 
 
 
14,492 
 
 
 
 
- 
8 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
- 
27,071 
 
 
 
8,623 
 
 
 
 
- 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
3 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
23,333 
 
Overall  
 
35 
 
6.45 
 
19 
 
2691 
 
9 
 
14,492 
 
28 
 
13,893 
 
3 
 
23,333 
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Sustainability
The data collected in the survey does not allow for an unambiguous assessment of the
sustainability of CBA in terms of future continuity due to lack of long term operation of
CBA tanks.  Out of 41 tanks studied, only 7 tanks had continued activity for more than
one cycle while one tank has entered into its fourth cycle of operation when the survey
was conducted.  Many tanks were in their inaugural year of operation.
The survey gathered information on the last complete production cycle, mainly for the
year 2003.  Many tanks had not stocked up for the ongoing 2004 cycle due to the
extended drought that prevailed at the time of the survey.  In tanks where the inaugural
cycle of production was being undertaken, inputs had been given on a free or subsidized
basis as a promotional measure.  Hence, it is premature to draw any conclusions on
the sustainability of the venture based on the limited information currently available.
As far as preparedness for forthcoming cycles are concerned, only in the case of 9
(33%) out of 27 tanks managed by the FSC were a part of returns (extended up to
60% of total returns) retained to finance future cycles.  In these tanks, a share of
returns was left aside to purchase fingerlings for the next cycle.  Overall, it seems that
the returns which had been set aside as institutional deposits to continue aquaculture
operations in forthcoming years are quite low, which is contrary to the expectations of
policy makers who advocate promoting CBA on a large scale.
A majority of constraints that were seen to affect the culture operations in tanks were
institution-related (Table 9).  Among them, the problem of free riders is the most
prominent.  This problem was reported in two-thirds of tanks in the sample. In a few
tanks, it reached a crisis level where authorities had to be called in for redress.  Hence,
the free-rider problem has the potential to cause a significant impact on the sustainability
of the system, making it difficult to rally necessary cooperation among community
members.  It seems that other major institutional problems, namely, conflicts in FOs
and mismanagement of benefits are also more or less interlinked with the free rider
problem.
In addition, the poor supply of fish seeds, natural disasters, and predators also have
the potential to affect the success of the programme.  However, their impact on the
sustainability of the system is largely due to productivity fluctuations with indirect
implications on institutional factors such as group cooperation and individual
participation.
In the next section we conclude by summarizing the main findings and discuss the
possible policy implications.
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Table 9: Constraints for community-based aquaculture
5.  Conclusions and Policy Implications
CBA in village irrigation tanks in the dry-zones of Sri Lanka is organized under three
institutional arrangements.  In these arrangements, either Farmer Organizations retain
management responsibility within themselves or contract it out to another party.  Forming
a FSC, a sub-group of FO, is the dominant contractual arrangement observed in two
thirds of the sample.  The major advantage of this arrangement is that it limits the
claims from CBA to a manageable number of beneficiaries.  Further, it allows for
activities to be undertaken by a limited number of active participants in an independent
manner.
All three institutional arrangements involve transaction costs which vary in magnitude.
There are three major types of transaction cost – information, collective decision-
making, and protection of the fish harvest from poachers.  While the cost for information
and collective decision-making are relatively low under all three arrangements, significant
differences are observed when it comes to the cost of protecting the harvest.  The
lowest average aggregate transaction cost is reported in FO-managed village tanks.
When management is undertaken by a sub-group or a third party, there is increase in
transaction cost to protect the harvest from theft or free riders.
On the whole, CBA has helped FO’s to generate much needed cash returns in a majority
of the tanks and moderately increased the supply of animal proteins to the rural poor.
Of the three institutional arrangements discussed here, FSC is the most successful in
terms of generating benefits to individual members as well as to organizations. In addition
farmers who have fluctuating incomes are able to increase incomes due to CBA. Despite
these achievements, however, individual benefits from CBA are low, thereby inhibiting
Type of 
constraint 
Constraint(s) Number of tanks 
reported 
% 
Technical  Poor supply of fish seed  
Poor tank selection 
Unsuitability of cultured species  
16 
2 
8 
39 
04 
20 
Institutional  Problem of free riders (Poaching and 
other problems from villagers) 
Poor participation 
Political influence 
Ambiguous legal status 
Conflicts in FO 
Mismanagement of benefits 
Problem of marketing  
27 
 
8 
3 
3 
10 
13 
6 
66 
 
20 
07 
07 
24 
32 
15 
Other physical Natural disasters 
Predators 
Premature harvest due to water supply 
uncertainty 
15 
14 
1 
 
37 
34 
02 
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participation in collective action. Sustainability of CBA would depend on its ability to
attract and sustain the participation of farmers. Even if the programmes are found cost
effective in terms of cash flow to FOs, participation is likely to be low due to inadequate
incentive. Further, the transaction cost for protection from poaching is high and will
influence participation of households who bear these costs.   Hence, the sustainability
of collective action for aquaculture would be contingent on reduction of transaction
costs and enlarging the share of benefits accruing to the active participants who bear
these costs.
Two issues merit special attention in terms of policy for CBA.  The first is a tank’s
ability to achieve adequate returns for its members.  According to the data, this varies
substantially among tanks.  Hence, selecting tanks with adequate productivity levels is
important.  The second is to account for transaction costs and find a mechanism for
compensating individuals who bear them. Further experiments with institutional
arrangements are required to understand how to reduce transaction costs and
simultaneously increase the productivity of tanks as this would impact the long-term
sustainability of community-based aquaculture.
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Appendix A
A brief note on community-based aquaculture
In Sri Lanka, reservoir-based freshwater fish production takes place under two major
sub-systems, namely, a) inland fisheries in relatively large perennial reservoirs;  and b)
seasonal village tank fisheries where community-based aquaculture is practised. Even
though both systems of production practically deal with the same species of freshwater
fish, resource use contexts in the two systems are different from each other.   Inland
fisheries in large perennial reservoirs have continuous, self-recruited fish populations
exploited by regular, full-time fishermen. These fisheries have been identified among
the most productive artisanal inland fisheries in Asia (de Silva 1989).   In contrast, less
productive seasonal fisheries in village tanks cannot support a regular fishing community,
under natural conditions and, therefore, annual stocking of fish fingerlings is necessary
to achieve higher levels of productivity.
Typically, an aquaculture system involves a three-stage sequence, namely, a) hatchery
operations; b) nursery operations; and c) grow-out operations.  Seasonal tank
aquaculture is basically a grow-out operation and, usually, the other two stages of
operation are fulfilled outside the reservoir site.  However, procurement of inputs
(fingerlings) from the nursery and immediate disposal of harvested output from the
tank site are also two essential steps in a seasonal tank aquaculture programme.
Seasonal tank aquaculture can be described as an extensive type of aquaculture practice
due to the fact that fish are stocked in relatively low densities and external inputs are
scarcely used other than fish fingerlings.  Once stocked, the fish are left entirely for
natural feeding for their growth.  Hence, the natural fertility in a tank is an important
parameter that affects the final fish output.  As a measure to exploit natural foods
available in different niches in an optimal manner, a poly culture combination of species
is usually stocked.
Given the associated conditions, aquaculture in seasonal tanks is a task left for the
surrounding agrarian communities rather than fishermen as the scope for involvement
of full-time regular fishing communities is quite low.  Hence, in the case of the
community-based aquaculture, the major rural institution involved is FOs.  However,
it is mainly a rural institution established for the management of minor irrigation structures
for paddy-based agriculture.
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